Non-bank institutions take note, stricter DNB supervision of capital and liquidity requirements

3 minutes

In recent years, the market has already noticed that the Dutch Central Bank (“DNB”) has been exercising increasingly strict supervision over compliance with and reporting of capital and liquidity requirements by investment firms, asset managers, payment institutions, and related institutions. In doing so, DNB also provided clarification on certain points regarding how it applies the capital requirements. See, for example, our blogs on this topic: here, here, and here (in Dutch only).

Last week, DNB reinforced its stricter stance regarding shortfalls through new policy, which also applies to a wide range of institutions. As of 10 March 2026, the DNB Enforcement Policy on Capital and Liquidity Requirements (the “Enforcement Policy”) is in effect (in Dutch only). The primary aim of the Enforcement Policy is to take stricter action. Institutions that fail to meet capital or liquidity requirements can now expect a formal enforcement decision from DNB immediately.

What has changed?

The explanatory notes to the Enforcement Policy indicate that DNB observed a sharp increase in the number of capital and liquidity shortfalls in recent years and that violations are lasting longer on average. The core message of the Enforcement Policy is therefore simple: whereas DNB previously allowed room for an informal remediation process, it will now, in principle, immediately initiate a formal enforcement process upon detection of a violation of capital or liquidity requirements. Specifically, this means the following:

 

  • Order subject to a penalty: After determining a capital or liquidity shortfall, DNB issues a notice of intent to impose an order subject to a penalty. A statement of views may be submitted within two weeks. The imposition of the penalty payment can be avoided if the shortfall is remedied within the two-week period for submitting a statement of views. DNB must be notified of this immediately, and evidence must also be submitted. If DNB decides to proceed with the intended measure and thus actually impose the penalty, the penalty may amount to a maximum of €75,000.

 

  • Administrative fine: In addition to an order subject to a penalty aimed at rectification, DNB may also impose an administrative fine. In principle, DNB will do so if the maximum penalty has been forfeited and the institution is still in violation. DNB will also impose a fine if the institution is in violation of the capital or liquidity requirements again within a period of 25 months (for certain institutions, this was already the case under existing policy). Under the Enforcement Policy, the amount of the administrative fine is based on a detailed step-by-step framework.

Starting point: disclosure without anonymization

DNB publishes penalty decisions and orders subject to a penalty payment as soon as they become irrevocable. under certain circumstances, DNB must publish penalty decisions and orders subject to a penalty payment as soon as possible. In such publications, the full name of the institution that, according to DNB, committed the violation is generally stated, because DNB does not anonymize decisions as a matter of principle.

Objections may be filed and appeals may be lodged against both the imposition of an order subject to a penalty and the imposition of a fine as well as their publication. In addition, DNB may be requested, through preliminary relief proceedings, to postpone publication or to publish the decision only in anonymized form.

To which institutions does the Enforcement Policy apply?

It is important to emphasize the broad scope of the Enforcement Policy. It applies not only to investment firms, but also to investment holding companies, parent investment firms, payment institutions, electronic money institutions, UCITS and AIFMD managers, crowdfunding service providers, and crypto-asset service providers (CASPs).

With the introduction of the Enforcement Policy, DNB confirms its position that adequate capital and liquidity positions are becoming increasingly important, even for institutions that have not traditionally been subject to strict prudential supervision.

DNB recommendations

DNB indicates that unnecessary escalation can be prevented if an institution informs DNB at an early stage about (impending) violations. We would recommend considering on a case-by-case basis whether it is prudent to proactively approach DNB and, if so, how. In any case, DNB advises to check now whether internal monitoring provides timely signals and whether capital planning and liquidity measures can be implemented promptly.

Conclusion

It is therefore now particularly important to be well-informed about the rules and requirements regarding capital and (where applicable) liquidity requirements, as well as DNB’s clarifications and interpretations thereof. In this context, timely and accurate periodic FINREP and COREP reports remain of great importance.